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Does Political Competition Matter for Economic Performance? 
Evidence from Sub-national Data 
 
SAIBAL GHOSH1 
 
1. Introduction 
 
In recent years, a significant body of literature has emerged which suggest that societies with well-functioning 
democratic regimes exhibit healthy democracies. The extent to which sound political systems precede or follow 
the existence of vibrant economies however, still remains a matter of unsettled debate. Research on this aspect has 
attempted to uncover the underlying relationship between economic and political variables. Some commentators 
argue that basic economic endowments determine the long-run economic performance of countries (Acemoglu et 
al., 2001). Others contend that economic and social factors shape a country’s growth prospects (King and Levine, 
1993; Barro, 1996; Levine et al., 2000). Yet, the way in which political factors fashion economic development 
has not been adequately addressed in the literature (Keefer, 2004). 
While competition among government service providers has received most of the attention in the empirical 
literature, a modest parallel literature explores the effects of competition for the political control of governments. 
In the political competition literature, citizens are usually treated as immobile, making the market for political 
control quite different from the market for government services. Recent attempts (Persson and Tabellini, 2000; 
Besley and Preston, 2007) mark a significant advance in the sense that they identify a mechanism operating 
through the political-economic channel. This is based on the premise that more vigorous political competition 
would lead to selection of politicians who are better at resisting interest group pressures to obtain transfers 
financed by taxes. 
In large federal structures, an additional dimension is introduced by the existence of component federal states with 
their democratically elected governments1. The latter, in effect, provides a convenient anchor for exploring the 
sub-national dimensions of policy actions. Towards this end, the paper chooses India as a case study and 
investigates the role of political factors on economic performance at the sub-national level. Borrowing from recent 
literature (Besley and Preston, 2007; Ferris et al., 2008), it develops a consistent set of variables relating to 
political competition and explores their empirical association with sub-national economic performance, after 
taking on board several controls. 
The paper makes several contributions. First, the paper augments the literature on the association between 
political competition and economic performance for an emerging economy. Most studies of this genre, either at 
the sub-national level (Besley and Peston, 2007), or at an even more disaggregated level (Ashworth et al., 2006; 
Olle, 2005) pertain to developed economies. None of the studies explore such interactions for emerging 
                                                 
1 I would like to thank, without implicating, two anonymous referees, for their comments on earlier draft, which 
greatly improved the exposition and analysis. The views expressed and the approach pursued reflects the personal 
opinion of the author.  
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economies. Given the differences in the historical evolution, institutional set up and legal structures, studies of 
emerging economies on this aspect can provide useful insights which can be representative of the findings for 
other emerging markets as well.  
Second, analyses of this genre for India typically focuses on the impact of general elections on macroeconomic 
outcomes (Karnik, 1990, Sen and Vaidya, 1994). Even fewer examine the impact of state elections on economic 
performance (Khemani, 2004). The impact of political competition on economic performance at the state level is 
an under-researched area of study. The divergence in the growth pattern coupled with the rich diversity in the 
political sphere across Indian states provides an interesting case study since the capacities of states to respond to 
political competition is likely to be significantly different.  
There is by now a substantial literature on the political determinants of economic policy (Alesina and Perotti, 
1995). Some of this analysis extends to the case of sub-national governments, with a political game being played 
within sub-national governments. This strand of literature focuses primarily on the impact of economic policies 
on budget deficits but does not take into account the broader constitutional mechanisms like government regimes 
and political competition.  
The paper also augments the theory of political survival by introducing economic elements into the argument 
(Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003). By weaving the political literature of selectorate theory with the economic 
theory of competition, it provides a better understanding of the factors that influence the political competition-
economic performance nexus.  
The rest of the paper continues as follows. In Section 2, we provide an overview of the relevant literature, as 
appropriate. Section 3 provides a brief description of the Indian electoral system with emphasis on state-level 
elections. Section 4 describes the data and the empirical strategy. The results of the analysis are discussed in the 
penultimate section. The final section concludes. 
 
2. Literature review 
The political competition literature comprises of two main strands – voter monitoring and political survival. 
Researchers have posited that governments that are difficult for voters to monitor or are controlled by powerful 
political parties tend to behave in a fashion that is different as compared to governments facing more political 
competition.  
Although voter monitoring is not directly observable, rough proxies for increased monitoring are associated with 
smaller and more efficient governments. By way of example, Oates (1985) argues that centralized governments 
are more difficult for citizens to monitor and consistent with this perspective, researchers typically find that the 
public sector is bigger where the federal government is a larger share of total government (Marlow, 1988; 
Grossman and West, 1994).  
A related strand of the literature, emerging from the political side, relates to the selectorate theory of political 
survival (Bueno de Mesquita et al, 2003). According to the basic tenets of this theory, there are two groups of 
individuals that are important for political survival: the first group is the selectorate, which defines the subset of 
the population that in principle has control over leadership choice. The second group is the winning coalition, 
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which is some subset of the selectorate upon which the incumbent depends for survival. Regimes vary according 
to the absolute and relative sizes of these two groups. Illustratively, democracies tend to have large selectorates, 
whereas in contrast, in authoritarian regimes, the selectorate could be confined to a narrow group of individuals, 
among which either a small or large proportion may constitute a winning coalition. A key point of this theory is 
that leaders hold the loyalty of their winning coalition by producing public goods (which benefit the society, in 
general) and private benefits (which confer “rents” for the leader’s supporters). Given possible threats to 
incumbency, the more the public goods the leader can “produce”, the higher is the chance of political survival. 
The political competition in turn, drives the economic performance.  
Concentrated political power is usually associated with monopolistic behavior. Anderson and Tollison (1988) and 
Rogers and Rogers (2000) find evidence that governments are smaller in states where power is concentrated in 
one political party. Lipford and Yandle (1990) find that state governments make up a larger share of public sector 
if a single party controls a larger share of the state government, a pattern which they attribute to cartelizing by the 
state legislatures. 
Of late, a series of papers (Svensson, 1998; Persson and Tabellini, 2000; Besley et al., 2006; Besley and Preston, 
2007) have collated the various arguments on the link between political competition and economic efficiency. The 
underlying logic is that severe competition for political office constrains the ability of politicians to engage in 
opportunistic behavior, as manifested in the form of rent extraction or other modes of inefficient behavior. Such 
behavior could, in a competitive environment, prove too costly because it could adversely impact the probability 
of being re-elected. Conversely, a large electoral advantage or a lack of (significant) political competitors is likely 
to lower the electoral accountability of politicians, allowing for higher rent extraction.  
Empirical evidence on the impact of political competition on government efficiency is of an indirect nature. The 
evidence on this count is mixed. Svensson (1998) for example, presents evidence that the efficacy of government 
spending in lowering infant mortality is lower in polarized (or, politically less competitive) economies. In a 
similar vein, Besley et al. (2006) find that increase in political competition in the American South is significantly 
positively related to personal income growth. Ashworth et al. (2006) find that political competition does not exert 
any significant effect on the efficiency of municipality performance.  
Besley and Peston (2007) on the other hand investigate English local governments (‘wards’), examining in 
particular, the effect of electoral districting on the policies proposed by parties. Each district contains a certain 
amount of partisans from the two sides, and a share of ‘swing’ voters. Parties therefore, propose strategically a 
nation-wide policy so to gain the favors of swing voters, and the party which has the majority implements its 
promised policy. Their finding is that if the policy is representable by a scalar, then both parties proposed policies 
will be biased towards the same side the districting is biased.  
As the aforesaid discussion indicates, the growing relevance of this topic has generated several empirical tests. A 
crucial feature of these tests is that the effect of political competition on economic performance can be verified 
when an exogenous shock produces a permanent change in the competitiveness of the market. In our analysis, we 
exploit such an exogenous event: the change in Indian election laws enacted in 1996 in response to the ever-
growing length of ballots in state and national parliamentary elections. These changes made it difficult for a 
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candidate to contest an election by increasing the requirements for being nominated and by doubling the size of 
the deposit that the candidate must risk when running for office. This provides an ideal variation for a ‘before-
after’ analysis of an exogenous shock.  Internationally, studies have exploited such exogenous changes in 
electoral rules on policy choices and policy competiveness, as in case of Israel (Bueno de Mesquita, 2000) and 
other developed democracies, such as US (Besley et al., 2006). No study of this genre is, as yet, available in case 
of emerging markets.  
 
3. Database and empirics  
For the analysis, we use state-level data for the 25-year period beginning 1980 through 2004. We selected this 
time period for several reasons. First, since we are examining long-run structural event, and not short-term 
electoral outcome, the time period seems extensive enough for long-run influences to play out. Second, the period 
coincides with the availability of consistent data on the concerned variables at the state level to clearly discern the 
impact of political competition on state level policy variables.  
The analysis covers 14 major states in India. Therefore, we exclude the ‘special category’ states that receive 
exceptionally generous grants from the Federal Government on account of their specific institutional 
characteristics and certain newly constituted states carved out of existing ones. Indeed, among the states that have 
been left out, there are many that have moved from being centrally administered to ones where they elect their 
own state-level governments only very recently and hence, the methodology for collation of data is at variance 
from the sample states being examined in our analysis. In financial year 2003-04, the ultimate year of the sample, 
these 14 states accounted for roughly 80% of India’s land area, over 70% of her population and nearly 75% of the 
domestic product.  
We explore the predictions summed up earlier by considering the relation between political competition on the 
one hand, and income levels, output expansion and public spending, on the other. Towards this end, we utilize 
two measures of political competition. We resort to fixed effects and year dummies, to overcome the conditioning 
phenomenon that are not directly related to the political competition-economic performance relationship, and 
employ control variables. Table 1 provides the definitions of the relevant variables.  
Three sets of models are employed, beginning with the one focusing on income levels, and thereafter on output 
growth and fiscal variables.  
 
Income levels  
To model the relationship between income and political competition, we adopt the specification similar to Besley 
et al. (2006) for state s at time t as given by (1):  
tstststs Zpy ,2,1, ελυαα ++++=                                                                                                        (1) 
where y is natural log of real per capita income, v are state fixed effects, λt is the time dummy for period t and ε is 
the error term. The variable of interest is p, the indicator of political competition. To ascertain whether pre- and 
post-electoral competition affects per capita income, we estimate (1) in terms of both number of seats (H-seat) as 
also the percentage of votes (H-vote) obtained in the assembly elections. This measure generates values between 
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zero (one party rule) and one (every seat in the legislative assembly is held by a different party or independent 
candidates). 
The Z vector includes several state level controls, including (the natural logs of) agriculture in net state domestic 
product (NSDP) which is a proxy for state economic structure, bank credit to NSDP ratio, which captures the 
extent of financial deepening, transmission and distribution losses of State Electricity Boards, a commonly 
employed measure for state-level institutional quality (Kochhar et al., 2006) and log population. Following from 
our earlier discussion, it seems likely that the impact of political competition on state output could be 
contaminated by imposition of President’s Rule, an aspect which we control for in the analysis. Besides, we 
include a measure of ideological competition, akin to those utilized in previous models of political competition for 
India (see, for instance, Chibber and Nooruddin, 2004). All models are estimated by using robust standard errors 
clustered by states that allow for state-specific serial correlation.   
 
 
 
 
Output growth 
The second relationship is in the nature of growth regression augmented with political variables as given by (2): 
tststststs ygZpyg ,1,32,1, ξλυγγγ +++++= −                                                                                   (2) 
where g(.) denotes growth, the remaining notations are same as earlier. The dynamic specification serves two 
purposes. The first is to differentiate any source of unobserved heterogeneity in levels of income. The state fixed 
effects allow for long-term differences in average growth across states. The second is to allow for convergence in 
incomes per capita, to rule out the possibility that changes in political competition are not picking up the fact that 
/certain states grew faster simply because they were initially poor. For these reasons, the lagged income variable 
is included in the RHS. Estimation of dynamic panel models is fairly standard in the literature (Arellano and 
Bond, 1991).  
Two sets of tests are reported to ensure robustness of dynamic panel model. Specifically, with respect to the 
validity of instruments, a Sargan test is conducted for the null hypothesis that the over-identifying restrictions are 
valid. The second test examines the absence of serial correlation in the error terms.  
 
 
Fiscal policy 
In addition to income, we also focus on fiscal variables. In particular, we examine the impact of political 
competition on state fiscal variables that are under the domain of state governments. Accordingly, we investigate 
the impact of political competition four such variables: revenue deficit, economic and social expenditure, tax 
revenues and fiscal deficit, all expressed as percentages to NSDP. The regression specification is given by 
expression (3): 
tstststs Zpf ,2,1, ϕλυδδ ++++=                                                                                                          (3) 
where f is the fiscal variable, the remaining notations are as earlier.  
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4. Results and discussion 
Income levels 
In table 3, column (1) displays estimates of (1) by OLS for annual data for 1980-2004. The evidence supports 
strongly significant positive association between political competition, measured in terms of percent of votes and 
per capita income. Besides the statistical significance, the coefficient suggests modest effects: the elasticity of per 
capita income with respect to political competition (H-vote), evaluated at the mean values of the variables, equals 
0.001. That is, a proportionate increase in political competition leads to an improvement in per capita income by 
roughly 0.001.  
The control variables exhibit expected signs. States with higher shares of agriculture have lower per capita 
income. It can be argued that higher shares of agriculture in total output could proxy poverty and high poverty 
would entail lower per capita incomes. Weak institutional quality leads to lower incomes. Higher population 
levels leads to higher incomes. This appears consistent with previous research which suggests that state 
population per se is tantamount to a measure of political influence. States having higher financial deepening, 
ceteris paribus, have higher levels of real income per capita, which is in accordance with the finance-growth 
literature.  
Model (2) repeats the same exercise, but in addition, supplements them with measures of ideological competition. 
Akin to Chibber and Nooruddin (2004), we classify State governments as belonging to any of the three 
ideological categories: Center-Center, Center-Right and Center-Left, where the control category is single party 
dominance. None of the ideological variables are significant at conventional levels, indicating that ideological 
competition does not appear to exert any perceptible influence on per capita incomes.  
It could be argued that these findings are likely to be less conclusive, since the coefficient α1 gives the causal 
effect of political competition on per capita income only as long as the political variable p is uncorrelated with the 
error term. In the context of the present analysis, because of omitted factors impacting both economics and 
politics, this condition could be violated. Besides, it could also be the case that higher income stimulates greater 
political competition, raising concerns of reverse causation. To rectify this deficiency, we also conducted an 
Instrumental Variable (IV) estimate. The results indicates that the coefficient α1 is quite large and strongly 
significant.  
 
Output growth 
In specification 1, the first lag of initial per capita income is 0.58. The rate of convergence is 1.5 percent per 
annum, which implies that it takes roughly 45 years to close half the gap (also known as ‘half life’) between a 
state’s initial per capita NSDP and its steady-state level of income.  
The coefficient of interest, the measure of political competition, is significant when competition is measured in 
terms of percent of votes. Furthermore, the size on the coefficient is also important: a proportionate increase in 
political competition, measured in terms of votes, leads to a proportionate rise in income by roughly 0.05. Thus, 
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political competition measured in terms of ‘majority’ appears to exert a discernible influence on growth in per 
capita incomes.  
 
Fiscal policy 
The results do not shed light on which set of state-level fiscal policies is affected by political competition. In the 
spirit of the model, we focus our attention on two programs for which responsibility is exclusively attributed to 
state governments: state taxes and economic expenses. Economic and social expenses are often characterized by 
high levels of wasteful (“pork-barrel”) spending, this suggests that tighter political competition should be 
associated with lower economic expenses (and therefore, lower revenue expenses). On the other hand, incumbent 
governments might signal their competence by improving tax administration and compliance, improving tax 
revenues (and therefore, higher revenue receipts). The net effect is likely to be manifest in a lower revenue deficit 
and consequently, lower fiscal deficit.  
The results are presented in Table 5. Tighter political competition increases economic expenditures: a rise in the 
explanatory variable by 0.5 (tantamount to a move from single party to two-party competition) improves 
economic expenses by about 5 percent.  
The coefficients support these contentions. In essence, the results concur with Khemani (2004) which suggests 
that politicians will tend to provide better public services and increase developmental spending in order to 
improve their re-election prospects (career concern). As a result, economic expenditures would be higher. 
Coupled with cut on taxes which directly affect the people, the manifestation of this aspect would be lower fiscal 
deficit. Since all regressions control for state and year fixed effects, it seems unlikely that the estimates are driven 
by state-specific factors or business cycle considerations.  
 
5. Concluding remarks 
Using data on major Indian states for 1980-2004, the analysis explores the impact of political competition on 
state-level income and fiscal variables. The results are broadly consistent with the predictions of theory. The 
analysis suggests that increase in political competition exerted a positive effect on state per capita income. 
Consistent with this finding, the evidence appears to indicate that political competition measured in terms of vote 
margin leads to a growth in income per capita.  In terms of fiscal variables, the evidence is consistent with the fact 
that politicians increase developmental spending in order to improve their re-election prospects. Further research 
will be needed to ascertain whether the theoretical implications carry over to cross-country studies and in that 
context, which measures of political competition matter for income growth and fiscal policy. Addressing these 
issues comprises elements for future research.  
 
 
Notes 
 
1. The words “state” and “sub-national” are employed interchangeably. 
 
2. According to the Indian constitution, the following items belong to the “State list”: public order and 
police, state taxes, agriculture, sanitation, forest, fisheries and public health. Education is on the 
“Concurrent list” indicating joint responsibility of Union and State governments. 
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3. These states, in order are regional location are, Andhra Pradesh (AP), Karnataka (KARN), Kerala (KER) 
and  Tamil Nadu (TN) in Southern region, Haryana (HAR), Punjab (PUNJ) and Rajasthan (RAJ) in the 
Northern region, Bihar (BIH), Orissa (ORIS), and West Bengal (WB) in the Eastern region, Gujarat 
(GUJ) Maharashtra (MAH) in the Western region and Madhya Pradesh (MP) and Uttar Pradesh (UP) in 
the Central region. 
 
4. The financial year in India begins from first day of April of a given year to the last day of March of the 
following year. Hence 1991 refers to the period 1990 (March) - 1991 (April) and so on, for other years. 
Given that the electoral reforms were effected in August 1996, hence our included dummy begins from 
1997. 
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Table 1: Variables and summary statistics 
Notation Variable 
Independent variables  
H-vote 
Defined as ( ∑
=
−
N
i
iParty
1
21 ) where Party is the percent of votes of political party 
i and N is the total number of parties represented  
Real p c  income Natural logarithm of  real per capita NSDP 
Economic expense Economic expenditure/NSDP 
Tax revenue Tax revenues/ NSDP 
Revenue deficit Revenue deficit/ NSDP 
Fiscal deficit Fiscal deficit/ NSDP 
Agriculture Natural log of (agriculture/ NSDP) 
Credit/NSDP Natural log of  (bank credit/ NSDP) 
T&D losses Natural log of (transmission and distribution losses of State Electricity Boards) 
Population Natural logarithm of (state population) 
dy_merger Dummy=1 for the years 2001 onwards for states (BIH, MP and UP) from which 
new states were carved out 
 
 
Table 2: Political competition and real per capita income 
Variables (1) (2) (3) 
 Fixed Effects Fixed Effects IV 
p (H-vote)  0.192 (0.089)** 0.242 (0.112)** 10.056 (2.244)*** 
Electoral year 0.051 (0.022)** 0.069 (0.045) 0.024 (0.016) 
Ln (agriculture) -0.014 (0.006)*** -0.011 (0.006)** -0.034 (0.012)*** 
Ln (credit/NSDP) 0.146 (0.050)*** 0.142 (0.052)*** 0.035 (0.054) 
Ln (T&D losses) -0.095 (0.041)** -0.099 (0.040)** -0.384(0.256) 
Ln (population) 0.603(0.302)* 0.615 (0.314)* 1.422 (0.116)*** 
dy_merger -0.376 (0.111)*** -0.378 (0.116)*** -0.013 (0.097) 
Constant  13.092 (2.043)*** 13.169 (2.124)*** 0.127 (0.793) 
Center-Center  -0.034 (0.053) -0.009 (0.056) 
Center-Right  -0.016 (0.017) -0.008 (0.027) 
Center-Left  0.019 (0.028) 0.009 (0.021) 
State dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes No 
States, N.Obs 14, 349 14, 349 14, 349 
Instrument   D1997+ 
Period 1980-2004 1980-2004 1980-2004 
R-squared 0.9732 0.9734 0.9364 
Standard errors (clustered by state) are within brackets 
***, ** and * denote statistical significance  at 1, 5 and 10%, respectively 
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Table 3: Political competition and real per capita income growth 
Variable (1) (2) 
p (H-vote)  0.021 (0.010)** 0.014 (0.007)* 
Dep. Variable, 1 lag 0.577 (0.053)*** 0.575 (0.054)*** 
Dep. Variable, 2 lags -0.139 (0.052)*** -0.135 (0.053)*** 
Electoral year 0.004 (0.012) -0.003 (0.012) 
Ln (agriculture) -0.005 (0.009) -0.003 (0.010) 
Ln (credit/NSDP) -0.199 (0.027)*** -0.201 (0.027)*** 
Ln (T&D losses) -0.005 (0.021) -0.005 (0.022) 
Ln (population) 0.311 (0.126)*** 0.306 (0.128)*** 
dy_merger 0.006 (0.009) 0.005 (0.010) 
Constant  0.048 (0.019)*** 0.042 (0.019)** 
Center-Center  0.003 (0.017) 
Center-Right  0.002 (0.015) 
Center-Left  0.036 (0.028) 
State dummies Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes 
States, N.Obs 14, 306 14, 306 
Period 1980-2004 1980-2004 
Sargan test (p-Value) 0.758 0.770 
AR 1 (p-Value) 0.000 0.000 
AR 2 (p-Value) 0.907 0.928 
Standard errors are within brackets 
***, ** and * denote statistical significance  at 1, 5 and 10%, respectively 
 
 
Table 4:  Political competition and fiscal policy 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Econ. expenditure Tax revenues Revenue deficit Fiscal deficit 
p (H-vote)  0.095 (0.043)** -0.008 (0.041) 0.027 (0.013)** 0.008 (0.003)*** 
Electoral year 0.035(0.043) -0.006 (0.011) 0.008 (0.004)** -0.002 (0.004) 
Ln (agriculture) 0.013 (0.008)* -0.017 (0.013) -0.004 (0.002)* -0.005 (0.003) 
Ln (credit/NSDP) 0.032 (0.031) 0.039 (0.014)*** -0.015 (0.009) -0.035 (0.024) 
Ln (T&D losses) 0.045 (0.071) -0.097 (0.122) -0.039 (0.035) -0.049 (0.026)* 
Ln (population) 0.049 (0.063) -0.189 (0.153) 0.107 (0.064)* 0.006 (0.043) 
dy_merger -0.013 (0.021) -0.046 (0.044) -0.004 (0.014) 0.007 (0.013) 
Constant  -0.215 (0.422) 1.389 (1.041) -0.775 (0.402)* -0.138 (0.301) 
State dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
States, N.Obs 14, 349 14, 349 14, 349 14, 349 
Period 1980-2004 1980-2004 1980-2004 1980-2004 
R-squared 0.3366 0.2748 0.6903 0.6618 
Standard errors (clustered by state) are within brackets 
***, ** and * denote statistical significance  at 1, 5 and 10%, respectively 
 
 
